


# Piracy and Conflicting Claims at Maritime Chokepoints and in Narrow Seas

Charles E. Morrison


East-West Center

# Global Transportation Patterns

## World Transportation Patterns




# Global Shipping Routes



# Big Container Ports

## The World's 50 Busiest Container-Shipping Seaports in 2012




# Two Maritime Threats: Piracy and War



# Characteristics of Chokepoints

- Strategically significant as natural or artificial narrow channels between two wider bodies of water
- Because difficult or expensive to avoid, shipping congestion at such points
- Examples: Straits of Hormuz, Malacca Straits, Suez and Panama Canals, Bab el-Mandeb, Bosphorus, Gibraltar, Danish Straits, Cape Horn
- May be magnet for geostrategic competition or illegal activity including piracy and hijacking.

# Maritime Chokepoints and Piracy (about 2010)




# Factors Facilitating Piracy

- Geography:
  - Concentration of opportunity (lots of shipping)
  - Availability of hideouts
- Weak governance (high corruption) or fragmented governance where multiple enforcement agencies (or navies) do not cooperate
- Economic dislocation
- Groups and individuals able and willing to take advantage of opportunity (pirate entrepreneurship and leadership)

# Three Main Regions of Piracy

- East Africa (Somalia) – rapid rise and then decline of piracy, with emphasis on hijacking and huge ransom payments
- West Africa (Nigeria) – much of “piracy” in territorial waters, mostly thievery
- Southeast Asia (Indonesia) – recent rise, but mostly thievery, robbery of ship’s crews possessions, petroleum from small tankers

# Global Piracy Zones





# Area of Somali Piracy



# Rise of Piracy off Somalia (2007-2011)

- Tremendous concentration of shipping (30,000 vessels a year), and safe havens along whole Somalia coastline
- Breakdown of national government and military forces, and highly corrupt local governments
- Fishing industry, encouraged and built up by Somalian government in 1980s, hurt by long-distance, illegal fishing and waste dumping following disbandment of Somalian Navy (including from East Asian countries).

# Beneficiaries and Losers from Rise of Piracy in Somalia

## Beneficiaries

- Pirates (3-5,000)
- Local warlords
- Local coast communities
- Insurance industry
- Security protection agencies
- Hollywood

## Losers


- Shipping companies
- Individual hostages
- National taxpayers for cost of naval operations
- Consumers
- Extra shipping costs estimated at \$6.6 to \$6.9 billion in 2011

# Characteristics of Somali Piracy


- Object was to chase, board, hijacking, holding even large vessels and/or crew for ransom
- Financed by local warlords and other shady but wealthy creditors
- Pirates had been professional fishermen and mostly amateur pirates
- Pirates originally believed they were defending Somali waters/livelihoods and had substantially local community support
- Hostages were rarely harmed, but often kept for long periods in hope of ransom

# Decline of Somali Piracy 2011-

**Number of Incidents**



# Ships Hijacked



# Factors in Decline

- Maritime companies hired security forces, committed to best management and security practices
- International naval cooperation: Combined Task Forces 150/151, EU Operation Atalanta. First time since WWII that all 5 members of the UNSC had military forces on the same side.
- Pirates forced to operate farther from home bases with less and less success, creditors no longer willing to fund pirate operations
- Governments showed increased willingness to prosecute pirates in national courts (1000+ pirates in 20+ national courts by 2012)
- Assistance to Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, including law enforcement, and local governments
- Increased local community and local government resistance to pirates, for example, in Puntland
- Currently no vessels at ransom compared to 10 in 2012, but some hostages

# INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION



- UN resolutions in 2008 onward authorized UN members to come to the assistance of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to contain piracy.
- CTF150, originally anti-terrorism, run from US base in Bahrain, command rotates (above picture)
- CTF151, specifically for combatting piracy
- Operation Atalanta (EU), specifically for piracy
- Ocean Shield (NATO), specifically for piracy
- Many individual national efforts

# Belligerents: Navies v. Pirates


- 13 NATO countries, including US, Canada, Germany, UK, France
  - 21 non-NATO countries, including China, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, Australia, NZ.
  - 5 cooperating African navies/coast guards
- Pirates



# Piracy ↓ Shift to S.E. Asia

## Piracy attacks 2009-2015

Piracy globally is off its peak, but has jumped in Southeast Asia



\*As of Sept. 11, 2015


Source: Bergen Risk Solutions

# Looking East Through Singapore Strait




# Strait of Malacca

Map 1: Transport and flows in the Strait of Malacca




# Crude Oil Traffic through S.E. Asia



# Southeast Asian Piracy

## Number of Incidents Reported



# Factors Contributing to Rise of S.E. Asian Piracy

- Concentration of shipping (50,000 vessels a year. 30% of global trade), slow speeds through Malacca straits, many hiding places (1600 islands)
- Weaponized region with many other criminal activity including smuggling, drug trafficking, and human trafficking
- Weak naval enforcement, especially in Indonesia, and local government/military cooperation w pirates, again in Indonesia
- Economic dislocations following 1997 Asian economic crisis and Global Financial Crisis
- Great potential for economic gain from oil cargoes

# Characteristics of S.E. Asian Piracy


- Still increasing number of incidents, most pirate-prone region of the world
- Most incidents are in Indonesia
- Most incidents, especially in Indonesia, are in ports; only 13% of incidents on high seas
- Pirates not interested in kidnapping crew or ransoming ships; mostly theft

# Characteristics of S.E. Asian Piracy (2)

- Pirates operate in small teams, often 4-7, but sometimes in coordination with other teams
- Many of the incidents are “petty,” and involve stealing crew’s possessions or goods on the ship
- Considerable theft of fuel of small coastal tankers; pirate transfer to own tankers
- On ground collusion, organized and coordinated attacks, intelligence activities, financing by syndicates interests involved in other illegal activities
- Pool of recruits from migrants elsewhere in Indonesia to Batam, Riau Archipelago

# Most of the SE Asian Piracy is Indonesian [2012] and Little in International Waters

**Occurrences According to Country and Area**



# Changes in Indonesian Piracy

- Enhanced Singapore-Malaysia-Indonesian naval cooperation had some effect in moving pirates out of the Malacca, Singapore straits areas.
- Increased dispersion piracy throughout Indonesia (Eric Frécon, *Chez les pirates d'Indonésie*) . Lack of local enforcement.
- There has been a significant increase in S.E. Asian piracy, making it the most dangerous region in the world

# Military Cooperation Limited

- Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore cooperate in Malacca Strait (MALSINDO, Trilateral Coordinated Patrol), but no hot pursuit into another country's territorial water
- Eye in the Sky program allows 3 km pursuit, but limited activity
- Naval ships unsuited for chasing high speed motor boats among islands and mangrove swamps
- Regional countries not “failed states” like Somalia; will not tolerate outside interference
- South China Sea cooperation limited by territorial disputes



# Piracy and China's "Belt and Road" Proposal

Countries along the Belt and Road should enhance customs cooperation such as information exchange, mutual recognition of regulations, **and mutual assistance in law enforcement**; improve bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of inspection and quarantine, certification and accreditation, standard measurement, and statistical information; and work to ensure that the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement takes effect and is implemented. We should improve the customs clearance facilities of border ports, establish a "single-window" in border ports, reduce customs clearance costs, and improve customs clearance capability.