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Session IV – Building Institutions to Serve the Region

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We have a signature project in PECC on this subject, but we were able to find five other people, much more prominent than ourselves to be the authors of this signatory project – Ali Alatas, a diplomat; Toyoo Gyohten, a prominent expert on finance; Long Yongtu, a former trade negotiator; Joseph Nye, a prominent intellectual and previously a government official; Ernesto Zedillo, an economist and former President.

I did not mention the countries these people come from because we don't consider them representatives of countries, but individuals interested in how we build a more prosperous, peaceful and stable region. So, we think they

are well qualified to work on this issue of regional architecture. Some of us will be trying to help them – part of the reason we're having this session is to try and generate ideas from this group that can be helpful to them as they meet and start their work on the project.

I would like to cover four aspects: what is architecture and what do we mean by it; why is it important; what assumptions do we make about it; and what are some of the issues that we need to address?

What is architecture?

Let me to start with a question – what is architecture? This is a relatively new term. I think it was not used much until about 15 years ago - it's not really used in the international relations literature. It's used in many different ways, but what I think it refers to is really the frameworks, agreements that order the interaction between states. So, it's not necessarily organizations, institutions, which include norms, rules of the game and so forth – anything that provides an ordering mechanism. This is very important in a world of states; again, in international relations terminology, it's a world of anarchy. States are sovereign; there is no hierarchical, political authority like there is within a nation, national government. So you need these rules of the game, institutions, or international relations.

So, why is architecture important in the Asia Pacific region? It's important because this system is really quite new. The states, in fact,

are new. Some countries are very old - China, Japan, Thailand, and so forth – these are old nations. But in their current set up, they are really quite new. Most of the domestic arrangements are from the post-World War Two era or even later. The relations among them were defined for a couple of centuries by, basically, European, colonial, powers – then by the Cold War. So we have a new situation where we are creating a system. Patterns are still conflicting and still evolving.

Asia Pacific is at the core

Secondly, the stakes are very high. They're high because, in historical terms, the Asia Pacific region has been moving from being an area of somewhat to the periphery of the core of the international system to actually the core. The core in the 19th Century was Europe. The core in the 20th Century and probably still today is the United States; but the core for the time ahead really will be the Asia Pacific. So, the stability and quality of the relations of the countries in and across the Pacific is going to be very critical, not just to this region but also to the world.

A third important aspect - we are really looking for a new paradigm of architecture. The European system had structure where there were a number of states of fairly equivalent sizes; there was a balance of power; or sometimes there was a concert; there was competition that resulted in power being projected outward; and there was a collapse. The collapse was so profound in the 1930s and 1940s that Europe started working toward a new architecture. The most important development of the 20th century was the transformation of Europe from an area of quarrelling states to an area where young people growing up did not even conceive of their countries in conflict with each other.

The US-dominated system was also different – here was a single country. International architecture didn't come up as an issue, except to the extent that the US itself was a hub of architecture that it could, to a large

extent, shape. So that was shaped around a core. It was one that privileged the United States - that day is passing. So with Asia Pacific, you have nations of different sizes – US, China, and Japan – currently at different power basis, but a lot of flux in that. So you have to design a system that will take into account the current distribution of power, but also, how it is likely to change.

The fourth reason that this new architecture is important, is because we also live an era of globalization and within domestic society of increasing plurality. So you need an architecture that is open beyond any particular region and take in this plurality at the domestic level.

The first assumption that I would make is that the foundation stones are very important. By foundation stones I mean the domestic states. In the European case – it wasn't really that the architecture failed but there was change at the domestic level, with the establishment of fascist and communist countries that did not accept the previous architecture. As I said, the foundation stones in this case – the Asia Pacific case – are still being, in many ways, consolidated.

The second assumption that I would make is that there is no single architect. In fact, there are a lot of architects and they are all trying to arrange the architecture to fit their own particular interests. So there's competition in what the architecture should be, and there's inevitably going to be compromise. I wish we had the picture of the Sydney Bridge still, but it's not going to be built like that.

In fact, that's the third assumption - very related – that there's no single architecture. No single architect and no single architecture. It's jerry-built. There will be lots of experimentation.

Fourth assumption, and also again related, is that it's always under construction. Issues change; what is doable, changes; and as result, the architecture has to change.

And finally, it's important that we can't take architecture for granted. Yuen Pau Woo said this morning that APEC – with capital Cs – collapses, the APEC – with capital a, p and small e, c – would continue to thrive. That's true I think maybe of APEC, but it's not true if it was the architecture as a whole that would collapse. This would be devastating for the region. We cannot take for granted that the architecture is stable even at the domestic level or at the international level.

Actors within actors

Now, I want to get to some issues – these have also been, to considerable degree, already addressed. The first issue that David Spencer addressed in the context is how to be inclusive, and how to also get things done. In APEC you have 21 economies; you have many economies in the wings; and you have some that have been left out – the Pacific Island countries are all grouped and brought in with observer status and so forth. In the global system, within the UN, you have the General Assembly; Security Council; the permanent five within the Security Council. Also in the international system, you have the Group of 8, you have the OECD. You have various institutions that have smaller groups of actors that can do things. Both do things in terms of ordering your own relations, and potentially because they are working together, do things to effect the larger system.

There are a couple of ways of having smaller groupings. One is based on geography. We have this in our region with ASEAN as a grouping; East Asia as a potential grouping, and so forth; NAFTA. Another way is based on interest – so you may have interests as in the Permanent Five, large countries. I think that's important. Large nations – you really want them to have good relations with each other because you don't want the world of small countries to be the venue for competition among the large countries. So sometimes I think that one of the issues in this region is whether you need something like an Asia Pacific five of smaller group of countries, but systemically important countries - might

even include India – that would have a smaller venue for their interaction.

The second issue is the connection between regional and global institutions. Usually you create regional institutions because global institutions have failed at some problem. The Asian economic crisis, for example, was perceived as a failure of global institutions and also Asia Pacific institutions, so it created interest in East Asia institutions; or where the global institutions don't meet the political requirements; or you have regional institutions to try and move the global architecture – the regional trade associations may be a way to doing that; or you can have regional institutions to deepen the global architecture. That's where I think APEC should focus in the trade area. It's not so much to create new liberalization, but it's really to deepen the adherence to the WTO process that is already there.

The third issue is: how do you strengthen and develop new architecture when you need it? Again, David Spencer mentioned this – do you do the big bang approach or do you do an incremental approach? The problem with the big bang approach is that you may not get anywhere – lots of vision but no path to get there. The problem with the incremental approach is that you may have no vision and so you muddle along and one way or the other, the architecture is built. But does it have intelligent design? The question is: to have both vision and building blocks towards that vision - there are stylistic differences in the region. In some places, people like very legalistic ways of doing things, building blocks and so forth. Others like much more informal mechanisms.

The last - and this is where I bridge into Jusuf - is the connection between the economic and security architectures. The economic architecture, as weak as it is, is more developed than the security architecture and both of them, really, at the moment, are still apart instead of together. Thank you.

Jusuf Wanandi
Chair, INCPEC/
Member of the Board of Directors, Center
for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Jakarta



Regional policy security

I am standing here to speak about one aspect that APEC may not be concentrating upon – that is the political security developments of the region and the urgency of why we should pay attention to these developments as well. The reason is of course obvious – economics, alone, can never solve the problems. After a certain deepening of relationship, we are definitely going to get also the need for attention of the political security aspects of the developments because, otherwise, the economic one is going to get stuck.

When the Cold War was over, we started looking for a new regional order. The global order, as you may remember, was a lacuna, that after the Cold War was over; there was no new thinking of a new global order to be established; and as such, we were struggling and getting along until September 11th struck – then we entered a new situation unprepared.

At the regional level, what we tried to do, at least, actually, Australia has played a part in that, since the mid '80's - and Canada to a

certain extent – when they were proposing, in the post ministerial conference of ASEAN, to establish a sort of CSCE as in Europe. But there was no time then and there was some bias that one could not bring in the European model – that's why it got stuck.

At the beginning of the 1990s, however, there was more pressure to build up to do something about the regional order as well as complementing the primacy of the United States' presence – particularly, militarily – in our part of the world; there was an idea of a more cooperative type of institution to be built. Not to replace the United States but really to complement and to make it much more palatable in tandem with this primacy. That's why the ARF was established as a follow-up of the post-ministerial conference with the idea that they should get into confidence building and preventative diplomacy and then conflict resolution.

Now the CBM part was excellent. I think they have done a lot in creating understanding, relations and trust, to a certain extent. But when it came to preventative diplomacy – and especially conflict resolution – the trust was not enough because this included the intrusion into domestic affairs. That was the problem and that's why it got stuck here.

I would like to argue that the ARF is still very important especially for confidence building measures, but through implementation and not only by just talking about it. So we have to make a talk shop into an action-oriented institution – then it will make sense; then it will continue. Also, we cannot take out the traditional issues – security issues – because they are opening up for these type of institution to be handled together – the problems of avian flu, the natural disasters, drug-trafficking as well as human-trafficking, money laundering, even terrorism – these could be handled. There is definitely an agreement, I think, across the board at the ARF, to do that. But again, this is going to depend on how ASEAN is going to react. The problem with ASEAN is that it's still very weak in this respect. So you have to help us;

to put the pressure on us to make us move on these issues and make it more into an action-oriented institution.

Six-party talks

In the future, on this particular problem – on the traditional issues of security cooperation – I suspect that the six party talks, if successful in getting over the nuclear proliferation of North Korea, could become the base for a new security cooperation; not only for Northeast Asia, but the rest of East Asia. In that respect, I think, we hope that there is success, of course a necessity, to show this type of six party talks – hard security issues – could also be dealt with between the regions.

Now, let me go back to the second part, which is of course, how does this related to Asian regionalism and where is that going, especially on the political security part? Well, you know, this East Asian regionalism has come about from a strategic sense. The main issues, really, is how to cope with a developing China that is growing so fast. We call it the peaceful rise; they call it the peaceful development of China and that's a problem- definitely; because everyone has been affected by that. It's not only economic – it's political. That's the main reason – the number one reason, I should argue – why we are thinking a structure should be established for East Asian nations so we can deal with China in the right way – and China with us.

Second, I think, is also to help create an environment for the normalization of the Japan-China relationship in the future; which is so critical of the leadership of the region, in the future.

Third – which is not less important, but the most important part – is to prepare for a peaceful relationship between China and the United States. It is still not completely stabilized because, as you all well know, these are two countries that are so big – one aspiring to become a great superpower; and the other, the only superpower. Change has always been of importance and difficult. We

have seen that in history. But it is not impossible to have a peaceful one, also as we've seen in the context of Great Britain/U.K. getting the leadership and superpowership to the United States in the mid 20th Century – actually after World War I.

So, therefore, I don't think it's an impossible thing that we could also have a peaceful relationship, at the end of the day. I suspect – in the longer term – that in this relationship between China and the United States, we are not going to see a region, or world, dominated by one power. In the future, it will be a concert of power – that is what I suspect in maybe the next 30 years ahead.

Now, in our region – definitely – the fourth reason is to help ASEAN. ASEAN can only get her act together if ASEAN can get the pressure and at the same time, the support that is needed. Only if the big countries are willing to do that, then we can become what they are expecting of us – the driving force of this regionalism in the future.

Now, where to we place the United States in this East Asian context? I definitely think, for one, there is a growing recognition of that. There needs to be, at the end of the day, a concert of power in East Asia. The integration of the economy is so deep and the political relationship is increasing so much, but, in the meantime, there is no super structure there, which we can call a concert of powers, or G8 or whatever, that really deals with the strategic issues of the region. I would like to see – definitely – the East Asian Summit which has now 16 members and then make that into the kind of body for strategic development and decision making for the region, as a whole.

That's why, for that matter, the implementation, of course, will be that the United States will become part of the EAS – the East Asian Summit – and the implementation will be done mainly by the ASEAN + Three countries – that's mainly on function and operation. The security is still

the ARF and possibly the six party talks to be the vehicle for that implementation.

Where is the nexus? This is the last point. I think East Asia should be embedded – as Hadi Soesastro put it in his paper – into APEC. So, that means, East Asia should be a very strong caucus unit in APEC development. This is still very critical, as you said earlier, to have this relationship between the two parts of the Pacific. I think also that the US becoming part of the EAS would strengthen the relationship between the two parts. And of course if the ARF will be then changing – then we definitely have all the partners of all the Americas and East Asia. Thank you.

Hadi Soesastro
Executive Director, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta



What are the challenges?

I think we have listened enough of what has been said about the contours and issues of regional institutional architecture in the Asia Pacific Region. Let me bring up three issues.

Why are there so many questions, disappointments, and sometimes, disillusion with the many regional organizations and processes in the Asia Pacific region, in both the economic and political security fields?

First, the broad issue of agenda-setting and the like. You have heard, already this morning, that some consider that the agenda of APEC have become so diffused. Others thought there was too much emphasis given to the trade liberalization dimension; and others still said you have to even have a much broader agenda that can link economic and security issues.

Second, about the way we organize ourselves - the modality for these processes. It has been dominated by what is known as the 'Asian Way' of doing things - consensus building, volunteerism etc. The question is: can it deliver?

The third issue is that for many of the East Asian countries - given what has happened in the last ten years or so - is the question of whether it's better for us to organize through East Asia. This is, at least from my perspective, a very important issue. When talking about the regional institutionalism architecture for the Asia Pacific, I think we need to talk not only to the APEC leaders, but also to the ASEAN leaders, to ASEAN + Three Leaders, and ASEAN + Six leaders, because in the end, they all must have sort of a coherent view as to how to organize this broader region of the Asia Pacific. Let me focus on this third aspect, first.

ASEAN in the driver's seat

The reason is that, ASEAN, where I come from, is put into the driver's seat. So, it's ASEAN that needs to have a clear view as to how it's going to organize itself. I think, in the last five, six, seven years; we've had enough discussions on whether it must be East Asia or it should be Asia Pacific. We come with a compromised notion of embedding East Asia in the Asia Pacific. I think it's an attractive concept. The question is: what does it mean, what does it entail for East Asia to be embedded in the Asia Pacific?

I think, first of all, it has to be accepted by all that is not only legitimate for the East Asian countries to organize themselves, but it is a necessity for East Asia to develop an identity so it can play a stronger, more constructive and useful role even in the wider Asia Pacific region. This means you can organize yourself as a caucus. I think that's how it will work in the end. It will strengthen APEC if you also have a strong East Asian caucus within APEC.

Agree on the objectives

Second, is that they have to develop a common understanding as to, what are the objectives of organizing this region? A regional order for peace, prosperity - what does it mean? We have to adopt a common view of economic openness, about good governance and about the importance of international regimes. That's, to me, what

embedding East Asia in the Asia Pacific means. In the end, this will translate itself into the two other points I made, namely, how to organize ourselves. I'm not going to elaborate on this, but you know what the question is - how far should we go in terms of institutionalizing the region, knowing that in East Asia, you still have a lot of hesitation and caution about institutionalization? They are more comfortable of going through this 'Asian Way', but somehow it needs to be strengthened. The experiment is on ASEAN now with the drafting of an ASEAN charter. That is important because it is the experience for ASEAN that can later on be expanded to East Asia.

Finally, how we organize ourselves; how we institutionalize depends on what is the agenda for Asia Pacific as a whole. It is here, in the end, that I think we will have to sit down because, ultimately, it is the agenda that will determine how they should organize themselves. This morning, I have heard very constructive ideas about what the agenda for the region should be - including issues such as domestic reforms. This essentially helps individual countries, in some kind of concerted effort, to make themselves ready to face the challenges of the Asia Pacific region.

Allan Gyngell
Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy



I think this is a particularly important time in the development of regional institutions – the only truth about them that we can confidently assert is that they are not where we need them to be and in ten years time, they won't be like what they are now. But almost everything else is speculation.

Why so many institutions?

The reason why so many institutions have sprung up is that – and it's a point that I haven't heard – each of them represents a particular vision of the region and each suits the national interest of one or more of the regional countries. So APEC represents a broad Asia Pacific view of the region; it engages the United States – still so critical to the economic health of the region and brings in the Latin America countries. ASEAN + 3, on the other hand, represents an East Asian-focused architecture emerging after the '97 financial crisis shook the Asia confidence in global institutions – but it's got its intellectual origins much earlier than that in things like Dr. Mahathir's proposals for an East Asian economic group.

Now, as with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, this is a model which suits China well, providing a greater sense of

intimacy with its regional neighbors. The East Asian Summit, ASEAN + Six, was supported by Japan, which is also attracted to an East Asian model, but seeks as well to balance China's weight with the addition of India, Australia, and New Zealand.

I think if you look back over 15 years, the single biggest, new development about the debate of Asian regionalism over that period has been the rise of India and how to incorporate India into it. The core aim of the ASEAN countries is to ensure that any regional architecture preserves Southeast Asia's centrality through institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum. Now the point is, beneath all the dry talk about regional institutions lies a vital, largely unspoken debate about the preferred shape of the region in twenty years time.

Why have we reached this difficult situation with regional architecture? One reason that Charles Morrison pointed out is that it matters more than it used to matter as global power swings back towards Asia – who's sitting at the table and what the table is like. It has greater importance to more people. But another reason there is so much confusion, I think, is the point that has been made earlier in the meeting that business has been getting on so well without institutions. Governments are not under great pressure to do particular things from the businesses, which the APEC – with the small e, c – is carrying on with.

Where to draw the line

The problem with the debate about regionalism as a whole is that it is being squeezed in two directions. On the one hand, the transforming influence of globalization is reshaping the way the world interacts – the way we invest, trade, and the shape of many of the problems we have to deal with. So we're far more aware of how broadly transnational many of the issues that we have to deal with are. This generates a whole set of new questions about regions. Does it make any more sense to include Latin America in an Asia Pacific regionalism, for example, than

the countries of the Gulf, which are so central as energy suppliers to East Asia. Why? So, globalization raises important questions about what sort of architecture we need by imposing new pressures for global, multilateral solutions.

However, at the other end of the scale, our traditional idea of inclusive, permanent regional institutions is also coming under threat from the emergence of ad hoc coalitions of the willing – which have sprung in response to the difficulty of making faster progress through established institutions. The Asia Pacific region has been particularly fertile with these – if you look at KEDO at the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Energy and Development; the Six Party Talks on North Korea; the proliferation and security initiative; the Chiang Mai Initiative; and especially interesting, in my view, the Bali Conference processes - which have not been the focus of very much attention – under which Indonesia and Australia have jointly promoted meetings to successfully address transnational issues like money laundering and people smuggling.

So, squeezed from both sides, our familiar regional institutions are either not broad enough to be globally useful – things like energy security or climate change - or insufficiently sure of what they are doing or moving too slowly or all of the above.

What to do about it

Now comes the difficult part – what should we do about it? I don't know. There's certainly a need for institutions to address regional needs. Again, a point Charles made in this Asia Pacific region where China and India are emerging to take their places as great powers; and that causes systemic stress. We'll all be better off if they emerge into a region which provides institutions in which all regional voices have an opportunity to be heard.

But, I don't think that a single institutional framework will do it for us. In fact, I'll go

further and say that a single, regional institution cannot do it for us because of the multiplicity of visions of the region and functions that exist. We shouldn't worry over much about a lack of neatness or consistency. I think the region needs to involve the US because so much of the region's future depends on the continuing dependence of trade and financial flows across the Pacific. I think that APEC is the best place to do that, but APEC has a fundamental flaw, as we all know, to address these issues that Jusuf was talking about – that is the presence of Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei. So, perhaps, as Jusuf again said, the East Asian Summit – with US membership – will be the best way of doing that.

Certainly, from the point of view of India, Australia and ASEAN, this is a better model than any expansion of the six parties talk on North Asia – of which we're not members; but if we're to use the EAS, it raises a problem - that is, how ASEAN exercises its leadership in regional institutions.

I end on a practical note. I've spent most of my professional life as a foreign policy practitioner rather than a scholar and I know that any architecture – however creative or elegant – needs actually, craftsmen and laborers to put it in place. We need to bear in mind the resource implications of what we have proposed. We're coming to a point in institution building where regional governments simply don't have the resources to service all the institutions now out there. It's true of Australia and I'm sure that it's true for a number of countries represented in the room. The APEC Leaders meeting has provided an invaluable contribution to the development of regional awareness. But we are only going to get our leaders to attend one such summit each year, if we're lucky. So, we need to make sure that we preserve what's most useful about what we now have.

Kim Kihwan
Former Chair of KOPEC/
International Advisor to Goldman Sachs



Strengths and weaknesses of APEC

Let me first say how happy I am to join this particular session. As you have heard, almost everyone has very original ideas to suggest and many provocative questions have been raised. I must admit frankly that I have not yet been able to digest all that. In any case, I'm basically concerned with the future of the APEC. So my comments and observations will centre on the strengths and weakness of the APEC.

The reason why I concentrate on the APEC is that I really care so much about the APEC as the primary institution to promote the regional cooperation in this region. The central point that I want to make is that as far as the institutions are concerned, this region has much to go. Currently, I think, it's at a very critical stage. The state of affairs, the state of the institutions in the region, in my opinion, is not satisfactory at all. We have to do something.

Well, think of the APEC – what sort of institution is it? To me it is still a very weak organization. It cannot do things in a timely way. It takes a very long time to identify

issues and address the issues. I will give examples of this point as I go along.

First, let me ask, how did we get to this very weak organization? Well, I think the story goes back to the times when APEC was launched. APEC was the first effort to bring the post-cold war era order in this region. The regional order or world order during the cold war was largely one imposed from outside rather than created from within. But the majority of countries or economies involved in launching the APEC also had a profound fear of too strong of power being exercised by a new organization or by certain members of that organization. So they were, in a way, all determined to make it a very weak organization; to make it very difficult to reach any sort of decision; and to make it very difficult to implement any decision once the decision had been made.

Enforcement through peer pressure

So, what do we have now? What we now have is that organization which cannot respond in a timely fashion to the needs and so on. But before I do that, let me just make a few points in what ways this organization is weak. Well, how does APEC enforce anything? Through peer pressure. How does it make a decision? Through dialogue, consensus and no rules. There is no executive body whatsoever – of course there is a secretary, but that secretary changes every year and hardly much continuity in the implementation of the work. As a result, there is no actual organ that can formulate the agenda – particularly an agenda over the medium and long term. Very little resources – on shoestring budget.

Now, what are the constraints? As far as festivities are concerned, APEC is a good organization. But when an important crisis arrives in this region, it cannot respond. A case in point is: APEC hardly did anything when the region was struck by the 1997-98 financial crisis. Many people were disappointed by that inability and lack of performance, so many felt the need to

develop another organization. The reason why the ASEAN + Three became such an organization in such a short time, I think, has a lot to do with the failure that APEC demonstrated.

Because of the organizational weakness, the institutional weakness, the kind of agenda it has been able to formulate has not been a very exact one or not a kind you can really pursue with any degree of rigor. An example I would give for this is the Bogor goals. To this day we do not know what the Bogor goals are about. APEC is supposed to have started to give great support and bolster the global multilateral trading system; and what happened to the multilateral trading system? I haven't seen any impressive declaration coming out of APEC that I wanted to take to another round.

Emergence of new mechanisms

So, the inability to deal with important, new developments lead to the emergence of the, as I said, ASEAN + Three and also encouraged the proliferation of FTAs - bilateral FTAs. As a result, this region is suffering what is called the spaghetti bowl effect, more than any other region. Then with the growing need to form an effective organization on this side of the Pacific – west side of the Pacific – has encouraged what everyone was fearful of; splitting the Pacific in the middle. As regional cooperation was not going at the sufficient speed, I think the region has revived the old, national rivalry among the two particular regional powers. China wants to pursue, to encourage and develop the ASEAN + Three and Japan wants to encourage the East Asian Summit. The coming of these two organizations into the scene is not something we can be proud of.

So, what can be done? The first three things that I mentioned is something the APEC Ambassador from Australia said this morning – we have got to strengthen the APEC Secretariat; we have to provide a bigger budget for the Secretariat to work; and then I think it's about time for us to institute a very

effective rule whereby decisions are made. Making decisions through discussion and enforcing that through peer group pressure is very unrealistic. The minimum step that APEC could take now is to turn the decision-making into one of plurilateral. In other words, on any decisions made, those members who agree with the decision, go ahead and implement them first and let the others join later as they get ready. Then I think APEC should have the power to enforce the multilateral trade discipline on the formation of the FTAs. We talk so much about the need for high quality of FTAs in this region, but no one is capable of putting in that result. So, I would like to see some organization made within the APEC to enforce high quality FTAs.

I think we should all also encourage the US to become engaged much more seriously. The US comes and goes and has not been very consistent with its APEC development. In line with this, I think, PECC ought to do something more. Fortunately, PECC has taken steps to enforce its capability of its Secretariat and PECC has also taken a move to increase its influence in terms of public opinion making by forming an advisory group, just as Charles informed you a while ago. PECC, I think, ought to be more vigorous in this new direction. Thank you very much.